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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated section 78A-3-102(3)(j). On June 1, 2009 the supreme court
poured over this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 473), and on June 3, 2009 the
court of appeals granted the Welshes' petition for permission to appeal the trial court's
interlocutory order. (R. 478.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1:

The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Broad Discretion in Denying
the Welshes' Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Expert
Designations Given Its Previous Admonishment That There Would Be
No Further Amendments to the Scheduling Order.

A trial court's ruling on a party's pretrial compliance with a scheduling order will
be overturned only if it was an abuse of discretion. Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc.,
2007 UT App 382, «|9, 174 P.3d 1. An abuse of discretion is established "only when [the
district court's] decision was against the logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice . . . [or] resulted from bias, prejudice, or
malice."' Johns v. Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ^[27, 214 P.3d 859; see also Brewer v.
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, f 16. 31 P.3d 557 (trial court's "exercise of
discretion . . . necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate
court can properly find abuse only if... no reasonable [person] would take the view
adopted by the trial court,") In determining whether there has been an abuse of

discretion, an appellate court "will not substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial court
unless the action it takes is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of [that]
discretion." Marchandv. Marchand, 2006 UT App 429, ^[4, 147 P.3d 538. Even if the
appellate court reaches a different conclusion, "[it] will not substitute [its] judgment for
that of the trial court absent an abuse of discretion." Deeben v. Dee ben, 772 P.2d 972,
973 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Issue 2:

The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Broad Discretion in Barring
the Welshes' Expert Witnesses at Trial As a Sanction for Their
Discovery Violation,

As a general rule, trial courts are granted a great deal of deference in selecting
discovery sanctions, and the appellate court overturns a sanction only in cases evidencing
a clear abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, ^[23, 199
P.3d 957. The deferential abuse-of-discretion review in an appeal of a discovery sanction
recognizes that trial courts must deal first-hand with the parties and the discovery
process. Id.
Issue 3:

The Trial Court Properly Maintained the Welshes' Due Process Rights
By Considering Plaintiffs' Opposition to Sanctions in Their Motion for
Relief and By Finding That the Welshes Engaged in Willful
Noncompliance With the Court's Fourth Scheduling Order,

In determining whether the trial court provided adequate due process protections
before imposing Rule 37 sanctions, the appellate court applies an abuse of discretion
standard of review. F.D.LC. v. Daily, 973 F.2d 1525, 1532 (10th Cir. 1992).

2

ISSUES PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT
The Welshes preserved these issues for review in their Motion for Enlargement of
Time to File Expert Designation filed on November 26, 2008 and their Motion for Relief
from the trial court's January 22, 2009 ruling on that motion, filed January 30, 2009. (R.
at 72-90; R. at 213-306.)
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(B) is determinative of the issues in this
case. This rule is set out in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of Case
On February 27, 2006, the Welshes filed a medical malpractice case against
Lakeview Hospital claiming negligence in the care and treatment provided to Wayne L.
Welsh. The Welshes are appealing the trial court's denial of their fifth request for
additional time to file their expert witness designations and the trial court's imposition of
sanctions that would prevent them from introducing expert testimony. The Welshes'
counsel failed to adhere to the trial court's fourth scheduling order that was entered on
January 30, 2008, two and one-half years after the suit was filed, setting a deadline for
expert designations. Instead, the Welshes filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time to
Designate Expert Witnesses in the face of a prior warning from the trial court that no
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further extensions of time would be permitted and that failure to comply could lead to a
dismissal of all claims. Nevertheless, the trial court did not dismiss the Welshes' case as
it threatened to do, but instead, denied Lakeview Hospital's motion for summary
judgment and allowed the Welshes to pursue a res ipsa loquitur theory, for which no
expert testimony is required.
Course Of Proceedings and Disposition Below
After the expert designation deadlines of three case management orders had
passed, the parties submitted a proposed fourth case management order on September 10,
2008, whereby the Welshes were required to disclose their experts' opinions by
December 1, 2008. Although the trial court initially denied the proposed case
management order, the order was ultimately entered on September 30, 2008 after the trial
court reiterated that it was the last amended order and that the case would be dismissed if
it did not start moving forward. (R. 61-66.) On November 26, 2008, five days before the
deadline, attorneys for the Welshes filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time to File
Expert Designations and submit initial expert reports. (R. 72-90.) Although the court's
clerk created a minute entry on December 29, 2008 stating that the Welshes' motion was
granted, the trial court itself denied the Welshes' motion in a written order on January 22,
2009. (R. 442; R. 204-12.) The trial court also barred the Welshes from introducing
expert testimony at trial as a sanction for their dilatory conduct. (R. 204-12.) The trial
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court reaffirmed its decision in a written order dated April 14, 2009 following a fullybriefed motion for reconsideration by the Welshes. (R. 370-81.) The Welshes filed a
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, which was granted on June 3, 2009. (R. 476-77.)
Statement Of Facts and Procedural Background
This is a medical malpractice case arising out of the care and treatment rendered to
Wayne Welsh by the staff of Lakeview Hospital on September 24, 2004. (R. 1-14.) Mr.
and Mrs. Welsh allege that while in the hospital, Mr. Welsh fell from a table and suffered
a fractured skull due to the hospital's negligence. (R. 1-14.) The Welshes filed their
Complaint, alleging negligence and loss of consortium on Mrs. Welsh's behalf, on or
around February 28, 2006. (R. 1-14.)
The Complaint was filed by Nathan Wilcox while he was a member of the law
firm of Anderson & Karrenberg. (R. 1-14.) Anderson & Karrenberg withdrew as the
Welshes' counsel in June 2008, and Nathan Wilcox moved from an "of counsel" position
at Anderson & Karrenberg to an "of counsel" position at Clyde Snow & Sessions. Mr.
Wilcox, representing the Welshes, participated in a key telephone conference with Judge
Allphin on September 30, 2008 to discuss the requested fourth and final scheduling order.
(R. 441.) Mr. Wilcox was the only attorney of record until Matthew Steward and Rodney
Snow, also members of Clyde Snow & Sessions, P.C., entered their appearances on
November 26, 2008. (R. 441.)

5

Lakeview served and filed its Answer to the Complaint on April 13, 2006, denying
all material allegations. (R. 17-24.) The trial court entered its first Scheduling Order in
this case on August 4, 2006. The initial scheduling order required completion of fact
discovery by December 26, 2006 and for the Welshes to designate experts by January 26,
2007. (R. 29-34.) The Welshes did not engage in any fact discovery prior to December
26, 2006 and failed to designate any experts by January 26, 2007.
In May and July 2007 letters, the Welshes requested the depositions of the hospital
witnesses and advised in the July 2007 letter that if they did not hear from Lakeview
about dates, they would notice up the depositions. (R. 355-56; R. 358-59.) In May
2007, the parties stipulated to an Amended Scheduling Order which provided that fact
discovery would be completed by October 26, 2007 and that the Welshes would
designate experts by November 23, 2007. (R. 42-^7.)
On August 2, 2007, Lakeview forwarded Notices of Deposition for Wayne and
Carol Welsh setting their depositions for August 30, 2007. (Notice of Depositions of
Plaintiffs, attached as Exhibit B to Lakeview's Opposition to Petition for Permission to
Appeal Interlocutory Order,1) Mr. and Mrs. Welsh did not appear for their depositions.

1

Lakeview's opposition to the Welshes' Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory
Order ("Lakeview's Opposition") was filed with the supreme court on May 28, 2009, but
was omitted from the appellate record by "error or accident." Utah R. App. P. 11(h).
Lakeview has filed with this Court a Motion to Correct Record seeking to have its
Opposition added to the appellate court record, and a copy of Lakeview's Opposition is
6

The Welshes did not engage in any fact discovery prior to October 26, 2007 and failed to
designate any experts by November 23, 2007.
Although Lakeview Hospital served its First Set of Interrogatories and Requests
for Production of Documents on the Welshes on August 3, 2007 and sent multiple
requests for compliance, Mr. and Mrs. Welsh did not provide responses to the written
interrogatories until October 1, 2008. (R. 48-49; Ex. D to Lakeview's Opposition to
Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order.) The Welshes did not produce the
requested documents until November 20, 2008, eleven days prior to their expert
designation deadline established in the fourth and final scheduling order. (R. 451-52.)
The parties again stipulated to a third scheduling order that was entered by the trial
court on February 11, 2008. (R. 50-55.) The Third Scheduling Order provided that fact
discovery would be completed by May 19, 2008 and that the Welshes would designate
experts by June 16, 2008. (R. 50-55.) Mr. and Mrs. Welsh did not engage in any fact
discovery prior to May 19, 2008 and failed to designate any experts by June 16, 2008.
When the parties submitted their fourth scheduling order on September 10, 2008,
the trial court initially denied it. (R. 440.) The court then ordered a telephone conference
to confer with counsel regarding the status of the case and to inquire as to why yet

attached to the memorandum in support of that motion. Because the Motion to Correct
Record is being filed on the same day as this response brief, Lakeview cannot cite to the
official appellate record, and instead will cite directly to the Opposition and its exhibits.
7

another extension of the prior scheduling orders was appropriate. (R. 440.) During this
scheduling conference on September 30, which included Mr. Wilcox (who was of
counsel with Clyde Snow & Sessions) on behalf of the Welshes, Judge Allphin indicated
that he would dismiss the case if it did not start moving forward. (R. 441.)
The trial court entered its fourth and final scheduling order on September 30,
2008. (R. 61-66.) The final scheduling order provided that fact discovery would be
completed by October 31, 2008 and that the Welshes would designate experts by
December 1, 2008. Lakeview Hospital was to designate its expert witnesses by January
30, 2009. Also, the trial court specifically provided that this was the "last amended
orderf.] [C]ase to move along or it will be dismissed." (R. 65.)
On October 16, 2008, Lakeview's counsel re-noticed the depositions of Mr. and
Mrs. Welsh for October 22, 2008. (R. 68-69.) The Welshes again failed to appear for
their depositions. Lakeview's counsel then immediately sent out a third deposition notice
for the Welshes' depositions to occur on October 30, 2008. (See Third Amended
Deposition Notice, attached as Exhibit H to Lakeview's Opposition to Petition for
Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order.) Mr. and Mrs. Welsh were deposed on
October 30, 2008, the day before the deadline to complete fact discovery pursuant to the
Fourth Scheduling Order.
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On November 20, 2008, nearly three weeks after the close of fact discovery, the
Welshes forwarded correspondence to counsel for Lakeview Hospital requesting that the
scheduling order be amended again to allow them additional time to designate their
expert witnesses. (R. 451-52.) On November 25, 2008, counsel for the Welshes and
counsel for Lakeview Hospital participated in a telephone conference wherein the
Welshes' counsel again requested that Lakeview Hospital stipulate to another amendment
to the scheduling order to allow them to conduct fact discovery. (R. 77.) Counsel for
Lakeview Hospital indicated that he could not stipulate to another amendment given the
trial court's clear mandate that the previous scheduling order would be the final order of
the Court. (R. 77.) On November 26 —five days before their deadline to disclose expert
witnesses—the Welshes filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time to Designate Expert
Witnesses. (R. 72-90.)
Mr. and Mrs. Welsh failed to designate expert witnesses by December 1, 2008 as
required by the trial court's final case management order. Having received no expert
disclosures from the Welshes, Lakeview Hospital filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
on December 5, 2008. (R. 94-102.) Lakeview also opposed the Welshes' Motion for
Enlargement of Time. (R. 103-34.) After the Welshes'Motion for Enlargement of Time
was fully briefed, Mr. and Mrs. Welsh filed a Request to Submit their motion for decision
on December 17, 2008. (R. 178-80.)
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On December 17, 2008, the Welshes filed a designation of expert witnesses that
named two experts. (R. 140-42.) No expert reports were included. On December 29,
2008, the trial court's clerk entered a note in the docket indicating that the Welshes'
motion to enlarge time was granted and asking the Welshes to submit an order to the
court. (R. 442.) Judge Allphin, however, did not enter an order granting the Welshes'
Motion for Enlargement of Time.
On January 22, 2009, the trial court issued a written ruling denying the Welshes'
Motion for Enlargement of Time and prohibiting Mr. and Mrs. Welsh from presenting
expert testimony at the time of trial as a sanction for failing to file their expert
designations pursuant to the deadline in the Fourth Scheduling Order. (R. 204-12.) The
trial court also denied Lake view's Motion for Summary Judgment in that same order and
ruled that the Welshes could still assert a res ipsa loquitur theory, which required no
expert witnesses.2
In that order, the trial court pointed out that the Welshes filed their motion despite
the prior warning that the trial court would not permit additional extensions of time for
discovery. Moreover, the trial the court cited the 'litigation's slow progress over the past
2

Despite the Welshes' contention that the trial court directed Lakeview to submit an
order reflecting its January 22 ruling denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Enlargement of Time
and the sanction barring Plaintiffs' expert witnesses at trial (Br. of Aplt. at 14), the trial
court actually directed that the Plaintiffs submit such an order. (R. 211.) No such order
was submitted by the Plaintiffs.
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two (2) plus years and the Court's issuing four (4) scheduling orders" giving the Welshes
"ample time to designate their expert witnesses and submit their expert reports." (R.
208.) The trial court held that the Welshes provided "no persuasive good faith basis or
justification" and denied their motion. (R. 204-12.)
The trial court held that due to its prior admonishment of the parties for not timely
moving this litigation forward and its express warning that it would not permit further
extensions of time or amendments to the final scheduling order, it was issuing a sanction
to bar the Welshes from introducing any expert testimony at trial. (R. 204-12.)
Pursuant to the trial court's Fourth Scheduling Order, Lakeview submitted its
expert designations and disclosures on January 30, 2009. (R. 312.) That same day, Mr.
and Mrs. Welsh filed a Motion for Relief from Order and For Entry of Order Enlarging
Time. (R. 213-306.) The Welshes claimed that the clerk's minute entry of December
29 was an order of the trial court granting their motion and they did not file their expert
designations in reliance upon this "order." Lakeview Hospital opposed the Welshes'
Motion for Relief. (R. 317-33.)
On February 10, 2009, more than three months after the close of fact discovery,
the Welshes noticed up the deposition of one of the hospital witnesses for the first time.
(R. 314-16.)
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The trial court denied the Welshes' Motion for Relief on April 14, 2009 in a
detailed written order. (R. 370-81.) The trial court reiterated that the clerk's note was
not the court's ruling on the Welshes' Motion for Enlargement of Time and confirmed
that the trial court's ruling on the motion was issued on January 22, 2009. The trial court
found that the Welshes were not prejudiced by the actions of the clerk on December 29,
2008 because those actions took place twenty-nine days after the Welshes' deadline for
expert designations, and also found that the Welshes' failure to comply with the
discovery order was willful in that it was not due to involuntary noncompliance.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
When it entered the fourth scheduling order in this case, giving the Welshes until
December 1, 2008 to designate their expert witnesses, the trial court demonstrated its
frustration with the Welshes' failure to move their case forward for nearly three years.
The Welshes were always represented by counsel and were fully aware that this was the
last scheduling order and that continuing to delay the case's progress would result in
sanctions, including the possibility that their case would be dismissed. Despite this
strong and clear warning, the Welshes did not move the case forward. Five days before
the expert designation deadline, they filed a motion for additional time, effectively
requesting a fifth scheduling order in direct disobeyance of the trial court.
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The court clerk's December 29, 2008 minute entry indicating that the Welshes'
motion for additional time was granted was not the order of the trial court itself. Rather,
the trial court's January 22, 2009 order constituted the ruling of the court, and it denied
the Welshes' motion for additional time and issued sanctions. Further, as the trial court
noted, plaintiffs' claims of "reliance" on the clerk's minute order ignored that the minute
order was not entered until twenty-nine days after the December 1, 2008 expert deadline
imposed by the fourth and final scheduling order. The trial court's decision was not an
abuse of discretion in light of the Welshes' repeated failure to adhere to the court's
scheduling orders and their defiance of the trial court's express warning that no further
extensions would be granted.
The trial court's decision to issue sanctions based upon the Welshes' willful
noncompliance was properly supported by the record. Barring the Welshes' experts for
their failure to disclose those experts was a narrowly-crafted response to address the
Welshes' specific violation. Indeed, the court did not order the drastic sanction of
dismissal that it said it would, instead allowing the Welshes to proceed with their res ipsa
theory.
Finally, the trial court maintained the Welshes' due process rights by clearly
warning them that sanctions would result if they again asked for additional time,
explaining the behavior that formed the basis for the sanction, considering the Welshes'
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arguments in opposition to the sanctions, and finding willful noncompliance on behalf of
the Welshes. Mr. and Mrs. Welsh will still have their day in court on their negligence
claims because the trial court allowed them to move forward on the basis of res ipsa
loquitur, for which no expert testimony is required.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE WELSHES' MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
TO FILE EXPERT DESIGNATIONS GIVEN ITS PREVIOUS
ADMONISHMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER
AMENDMENTS TO THE SCHEDULING ORDER.
"A trial judge is given a great deal of latitude in determining the most fair and

efficient manner to conduct court business.'' Morton v. Continental Banking Co., 938
P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997). The trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the status of
a case, as well as the attitudes, motives, and credibility of the parties. Id. Judge Allphin
had been involved in this case for almost three years at the time he denied the Welshes'
motion for enlargement of time. He had ruled on motions, participated in phone
conferences with the parties, and signed multiple case management orders. In his fourth
and final scheduling order dated September 30, 2008, Judge Allphin wrote that this
would be the "last amended order, case to move along or it will be dismissed." Thus, the
trial court's decision to deny the Welshes' request for additional time was not rash or
abusive Judge Allphin expressly warned the Welshes that failure to comply with the
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fourth and final amended scheduling order, including the Welshes' disclosure of their
expert witnesses by December 1, 2008, could result in dismissal. (R. 65.)
Although the Welshes were aware of the deadline and the consequences for not
complying (as evidenced by the presence of their counsel, Mr. Wilcox, on the September
30 scheduling conference call with the trial court and their counsel's motion for
additional time filed before the disclosure deadline), the Welshes chose not to obey the
court's Fourth Scheduling Order requiring disclosure of their experts by December 1,
2008. Their request for an extension of time was not "reasonable" given the court's prior
express warning that no further extension would be given. "While scheduling orders
should never be so inflexible as to not accommodate exigencies that may occur, they are
necessary to expedite the flow of cases through the court system and should not be lightly
disregarded." Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993).
The Welshes claim that the trial court "unequivocally" granted their Motion for an
Enlargement of Time based upon the contents of the court clerk's December 29, 2008
minute entry. (Br. of Aplt. At 21.) However, the clerk's minute entry did not constitute
the trial court's ruling on the Motion.3 The trial court noted:

The fact that Judge Allphin's court clerk signed scheduling orders on occasion on behalf
of Judge Allphin to send to the parties, while the copies of the orders in the original
record contain the judge's signature, does not elevate the clerk's role to that of a judge.
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[T]he Court neither entered a minute entry, made an oral ruling or order on
the record, nor prepared or executed a ruling or order to that effect. Quite
simply, no ruling was issued on the Welshes' motion for enlargement of
time until the Court issued its written Ruling of January 22, 2009.
(R. 376.) Indeed, a minute entry is not a binding order of the court. See Cook v.
Gardner, 381 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1963) (minute entry is superseded by the document
signed by the judge which becomes the order of the court); see also South Salt Lake v.
Burton, 718 P.2d 405, 406 (Utah 1986) (clerk's post-trial minute entry of judgment that
was not signed by the judge was not susceptible of enforcement); In re Discipline of Alex,
2004 UT 81, 99 P.3d 865 (commencement of the 30 day deadline to file a notice of
appeal was not the date of the minute entry reflecting the court's intention to deny a
motion, but instead was the actual date the court entered an order denying the motion).
Since the minute entry was not a binding order of the court, Judge Allphin's January 22,
2009 order denying the Welshes' motion for additional time was not a "reversal" of the
minute entry, nor was it done sua sponte. Additionally, the Welshes' proposed order
granting their Motion for Enlargement of Time, drafted in response to the court clerk's
December 29, 2008 minute entry, was never signed by Judge Allphin. (R. 198-99.)
The Welshes contend the trial court improperly corrected a judicial error instead of
a clerical error pursuant to Rule 60(a) when it changed its ruling from "motion granted"
in the December 29 minute entry to "motion denied" in the trial court's January 22 order.
(Br. of Aplt. at 24.) There was no need to correct any error by the trial court because the
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December 29, 2008 minute entry did not constitute a binding order of the trial court and it
was superseded by the trial court's January 22, 2009 order. See Morgan v. Morgan, 854
P.2d 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (minute entry awarding 100% of stocks to husband in
divorce proceeding superseded by court's decree awarding husband 75% of stocks;
language of decree took precedence over any alleged inconsistent language in court's
minute entry addressing the division of the parties' stock). Even if the January 22, 2009
order is deemed a correction of the December 29, 2008 minute entry, trial courts have
clear discretion to reconsider and change their position with respect to any orders or
decisions as long as no final judgment has been entered. Brookside Mobile Home Park,
Ltd v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ^18, 48 P.3d 968; Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).
The Welshes contend that they relied on the court clerk's December 29, 2008
minute entry and phone call advising them that their motion was granted and their
reliance resulted in "considerable expense" in completing their expert reports. But the
Welshes' claim rings hollow, given that they first designated two of their three expert
witnesses on December 17, 2008 and presumably had already confirmed their opinions in
advance of this designation. (R. 140-42.)
Moreover, any notations in the docket or statements made by the court clerk
twenty-nine days after the deadline for expert designations could not possibly have
influenced Mr. and Mrs. Welsh to assume, at any time before that, that the December 1st
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deadline was extended. As the trial court noted, "this assumption [was] unjustified,
particularly in light of the [trial] Court's prior admonishments and express warning
within the [Fourth Scheduling Order] that no further extensions of time would be
permitted." (R. 377.) The mere filing of a motion for enlargement of time did not relieve
the Welshes of their duty under the Fourth Scheduling Order to serve expert designations
and reports by December 1, 2008.
The Welshes cite two cases for the premise that justice and fairness required that
the trial court allow them to designate witnesses after the court-imposed deadline. (Br. of
Aplt. at 21.) However, the facts in those cases are substantially different from those at
issue in this case. In Carman v. Slovens, 546 P.2d 601 (1976), plaintiff filed a notice for
defendant to appear for his deposition and produce documents six weeks after service of
the newly-filed complaint was perfected on defendant. Defendant did not appear for his
deposition, and shortly thereafter, defendant's counsel withdrew his representation. The
trial court defaulted the defendant as a result of his failure to appear at his deposition.
Citing the principle that reason and justice shall prevail over the arbitrary and
uncontrolled will of a judge, the supreme court held the trial court abused its discretion
and vacated the order. Id. at 602.
The procedural history of this case involves not six weeks of delay as in Carmen,
but almost three years and four scheduling orders, during which time the Welshes failed

1«

to move this case forward by answering written discovery or by presenting Mr. and Mrs.
Welsh for their depositions. Moreover, the Welshes filed a motion for an extension of
time to designate their expert witnesses after receiving a warning from the judge that they
would receive a sanction of dismissal if they did not comply with the fourth scheduling
order.
The Welshes also cite to Boice ex. rel Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, 982 P.2d
565, to support their claim that the trial court's denial of their motion for an extension of
time was unfair and unjust. In Boice, the plaintiffs expert unexpectedly withdrew as a
trial witness after the expert deadline and the plaintiff moved to substitute another expert
witness before the final discovery cut-off date. Based upon the specific facts of that case,
the supreme court found the trial court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiffs
substitute expert witness.
The facts in Boice have no application to this case. Here, the Welshes never
designated any expert witness at any time prior to the expiration of the fourth deadline for
designation of expert witnesses. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The Welshes contend that they were precluded from complying with the fourth
scheduling order because of a delay in transferring their case over to "new" counsel in
November 2008. (Br. of Aplt. at 20.) But regardless of their attorney Nathan Wilcox's
change of law firms, Mr. Wilcox represented the Welshes during the September 30, 2008
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telephone conference wherein Judge Allphin agreed to the final fourth amended
scheduling order and issued a warning about dismissal of the case if the Welshes failed to
comply with that order. Therefore, although Mr. Rodney Snow and Mr. Matthew
Steward did not file appearances with the court until November 26, 2008, Mr. and Mrs.
Welsh were continuously represented by Mr. Wilcox, who was associated with Mr.
Snow's and Mr. Steward's firm before, during, and after Judge Allphin's warning. Thus,
the December 1, 2008 deadline and the consequences for noncompliance with the
deadline were known, or should have been known, for two months before the December
1,2008 deadline.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS BROAD
DISCRETION IN BARRING THE WELSHES' EXPERT WITNESSES AT
TRIAL AS A SANCTION FOR THEIR DISCOVERY VIOLATION.
A.

The Trial Court Was Empowered to Bar the Welshes' Expert
Witnesses as a Sanction for Their Discovery Violation.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure empower the trial court to sanction a party for
discovery violations. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 1J9, 977 P.2d
508; Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in
relevant part that "[i]f a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pre-trial
order . . . the court, upon a motion or its own initiative, may take any action authorized by
Rule 37(b)(2)." Rule 37(b)(2)(B) provides in turn that if a party fails to obey an order
entered under Rule 16(d), the court may prohibit the offending party from introducing
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certain matters into evidence, such as witness testimony. See Utah R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(B).
On multiple occasions, Utah courts have affirmed a trial court's decision to bar or
limit testimony when witnesses have been untimely designated. See Griffith v. Griffith,
1999 UT 78,1J20, 985 P.2d 255 (trial court did not abuse discretion in barring plaintiffs
witness at trial after failure to include witness on list required by court; sanction was
reasonable response to the failure to comply with the court's managerial plan); DeBry v.
Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Utah 1994) (trial court did not abuse discretion in
barring all of plaintiffs' expert witnesses for failure to comply with the scheduling order);
Rukavina v. Sprague, 2007 UT App 331,fflJ8-9,170 P.3d 1138 (failure to comply with
discovery was sanctionable and exclusion of witness and limitation of other witnesses'
testimony was appropriate); Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993) (trial
court did not abuse discretion in barring expert's affidavit when not filed by deadline in
scheduling order); see also Stevenett, 1999 UT App 80, TJ24 (defendant violated discovery
order in failing to supplement interrogatories regarding affirmative defenses; expert's
testimony supporting affirmative defenses was limited as a sanction).
Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C), courts have even dismissed a party's claims in their
entirety for failing to comply with court-imposed discovery deadlines. See Morton v.
Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274-75 (Utah 1997) (affirming dismissal of
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personal injury action due to plaintiffs failure to comply with discovery orders); Preston
& Chambers, P.C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (affirming trial
court's dismissal of defendant's counterclaim after he failed to comply with court's
deadline to disclose expert witnesses); Arnica Mut Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950,
962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding defendant's default was not an abuse of discretion due
to his failure to comply with a court order compelling discovery). Here the trial court
threatened to dismiss the Welshes' entire case, but ultimately resorted to a less severe
sanction—even though dismissing the case in its entirety would have been well within
the court's discretion.
B.

The Trial Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion in Barring the
Welshes' Expert Witnesses As A Sanction For Their Willful Discovery
Violation of the Fourth Scheduling Order,

To warrant sanctions for failure to comply with discovery, a trial court must
determine that one of the following circumstances exist: "(1) the party's behavior was
willful; (2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court can attribute some fault to the
party; or (4) the party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the
judicial process." Morton, 938 P.2d at 276. Willful failure is defined as "any intentional
failure as distinguished from involuntary noncompliance. No wrongful intent need be
shown." M.E.N. Co. v. Control Fluidics, Inc., 834 F.2d 869, 872-73 (10th Cir. 1987).
Once this initial determination is made, the full range of options for sanctions under Rule
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37 is available and the trial court has broad discretion to select which sanction to apply
under the circumstances. Morton, 938 P.2d at 274.
In assessing the Welshes' behavior, the trial court noted that Mr. and Mrs. Welsh
failed to comply with three prior court orders over the course of three years of litigation
and they were well aware of the December 1st expert discovery deadline as well as the
trial court's prior admonishment regarding the slow progress of the case. They had
previously been warned that the Fourth Scheduling Order was the last and that if the case
was not "moved along" it would be dismissed. Still, they filed a Motion for Enlargement
of Time and failed to disclose their experts by the deadline imposed by the court.
This behavior does not constitute involuntary noncompliance, but instead, an
affirmative failure by the Welshes to adhere to deadlines. The court added that Mr. and
Mrs. Welsh asserted no surprise, unforeseen circumstances, or any other legitimate
excuse for their failure to timely file their expert designations. See Morton, 938 P.2d at
275 ("Any mistakes, inadvertence and neglect which may have occurred at the office of
the plaintiffs' counsel are not an excuse for the manner in which the plaintiffs' counsel
has handled this matter."). Based upon these facts, the trial court properly determined
that the Welshes' failure to comply was willful and not due to involuntary
noncompliance.
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In Preston & Chambers, PC. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), a case
substantially similar to this case, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's outright
dismissal of defendant's counterclaims on the ground that he engaged in dilatory tactics
and failed to comply with a court-imposed deadline to designate expert witnesses. After
nearly three years of litigation, the trial court issued a deadline for disclosure of expert
witnesses and expressly stated that the defendant's counterclaims would be dismissed if
he did not comply. The appellate court concluded the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the defendant's counterclaims after finding he had ample time to
designate an expert and he failed to comply with the order even after receiving notice of
the consequences.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Welshes did not actively pursue this case for
almost three years and were warned by the trial court that it might dismiss the case if the
Welshes continued their noncompliance with the court's scheduling orders. Despite these
facts showing a willful failure to comply with the trial court's order, Judge Allphin, in the
proper exercise of his broad discretion, did not dismiss the Welshes' case but chose the
less-severe sanction of barring the testimony of the witnesses who were not timely
disclosed.
The trial court's failure to specifically reference the Welshes' willful
noncompliance in its January 22 order is not dispositive. First, the trial court cited the
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basis for its decision to issue sanctions in its January 22 order, including the Welshes'
failure to submit their expert reports by the deadline even after the trial court expressly
warned that it would not permit further amendments to the schedule and that the Welshes
risked sanctions if they failed to comply. Second, the point is mooted by the fact that the
trial court included a recitation of the evidence of the Welshes' willful behavior and made
the requisite finding of willfulness in its April 14, 2009 order addressing the Welshes'
Motion for Relief from the January 22 order. (R. 370-81.) Third, even if the trial court
had not made such a finding in its April 14th order, it would not be grounds for reversal if
a full understanding of the issues on appeal could nevertheless be determined by the
appellate court. See Arnica Mut. Ins,, 768 P,2d at 962 (no reversible error for trial court's
failure to make specific finding of willfulness due to evidence of willful and bad faith
conduct in the record); Preston & Chambers, P.C., 943 P.2d at 263 (failure to articulate
specific finding of willfulness, bad faith, fault, or dilatory tactics is not ground for
reversal if findings appear in trial court's opinion or elsewhere to sufficiently indicate the
factual basis for the ultimate conclusion); see also Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^[10, 52
P.3d 1158 (an "appellate court may affirm on . . . any theory apparent on the record"
(citation omitted)).
The Welshes contend they are "more innocent" of any intentional misconduct than
the parties in other cases where sanctions have been overturned because they did not
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disregard an existing case management order. (Br. of Aplt. at 28.) Each of the cases
cited by the Welshes involves the reversal of sanctions following a single misstep without
any indication that the court had previously put the offending party on notice that
sanctions would be assessed for noncompliance. See Carmen v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601
(Utah 1976) (supreme court reversed the trial court's decision to enter judgment against
defendant following his first and only failure to appear at his deposition and produce
documents); Bonneville Billing & Collections v. Wall, 2008 UT App 35, 2008 WL
256584 (court of appeals reversed trial court's default of defendant based upon his
absence at first required court appearance; there was no evidence he had notice of the
appearance and no finding that his actions were part of a series of actions indicating he
was disrespectful of the court's orders).
In this case, the Welshes' failure to comply with the December 1, 2008 expert
designation deadline was the culmination of a series of actions in which they disregarded
the court's scheduling orders. They did not comply with any of the first three case
management orders providing deadlines for fact discovery or expert designation
deadlines. The Welshes were not relieved from complying with the December 1, 2008
expert designation deadline just because they filed a Motion for an Enlargement of Time
five days before the deadline to designate their expert witnesses. Moreover, they
requested a fifth scheduling order after being expressly warned that the fourth scheduling
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order would be the last one and the case would be dismissed if it was not moved along.
"In cases meriting sanctions, there is often a consistent pattern of behavior disregarding
discovery requirements or court orders, as well as evidence that the sanctioned party is on
notice that its pattern of behavior will result in sanctions if it continues." Kilpatrick v.
Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, ^|35, 199 P.3d 957. This is precisely such a case.
Furthermore, the record shows that the Welshes delayed more than just their
disclosure of expert witnesses. Although Lakeview Hospital sent Mr. and Mrs. Welsh
written discovery in August 2007, the Welshes failed to answer interrogatories until
October 2008 and failed to produce the requested documents until November 20, 2008
(after the close of fact discovery deadline and approximately eleven days before their
expert designations were due). The Welshes did not appear for their depositions, which
were initially noticed by Lakeview Hospital to take place on August 30, 2007. Following
the trial court's admonishment that the Fourth Scheduling Order would be the last,
Lakeview Hospital immediately re-noticed the Welshes' depositions for October 22,
2008. Mr. and Mrs. Welsh finally appeared for their depositions on October 30, 2008,
one day before the conclusion of fact discovery. During this same period, the Welshes
conducted no discovery and then failed for the fourth time to designate expert witnesses.
It was the Welshes' duty to move the case forward. See Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App
75, *fl27, 999 P.2d 588 (although plaintiff bears "the primary responsibility for moving the
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case along" she showed little interest in diligently pursuing her cause of action); Country
Meadows Convalescent Ctr. v. Utah Dep't of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1216(UtahCt.
App. 1993) ("[T]he duty to prosecute is a duty of due diligence imposed on a plaintiff,
not on a defendant").
The Welshes wrongly assert that the Lakeview Hospital's failure to present its
employees for their depositions ''contributed significantly" to the delay in disclosing their
experts by the December 1, 2008 deadline. (Br. of Aplt. at 30.) Besides the three letters
requesting dates for the depositions (including one sent twenty days after the close of fact
discovery), the Welshes have offered no actual support for their unfounded allegation that
Lakeview Hospital blocked their efforts at discovery. The Welshes' counsel did not issue
a single deposition notice until well after fact discovery closed, even though he said he
would do so in a July 2007 letter if he did not hear from Lakeview Hospital soon about
potential dates. (R. 358-59.)
Notably, the Welshes' Motion for Enlargement of Time did not even request
additional time to complete the hospital witness depositions. If these depositions were
critical to the Welshes' ability to designate experts, it is axiomatic that they would have
included this request in their motion. Moreover, if the Welshes' counsel believed that
Lakeview Hospital was improperly prohibiting them from taking these depositions, the
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appropriate course of action would have been to file a motion to compel the discovery.4
The fact that the Welshes have never filed such a motion conclusively demonstrates that
this discovery was never actively pursued and that Lakeview Hospital has not engaged in
any inappropriate conduct that precluded the Welshes from taking these depositions.
The Welshes contend that the trial court's sanction improperly targeted the
Welshes instead of their attorneys for the discovery violation. The barring of expert
witnesses is not a sanction aimed directly at the Welshes, as opposed to a monetary fine,
a finding of contempt of court, or a complete dismissal of the complaint. Moreover, the
supreme court in Kilpatrick recognized that sanctions lodged against an attorney will
typically also impact a client. Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82 at ^[39. In Kilpatrick, the court
recognized that a missing evidence instruction due to plaintiffs' failure to obtain a court
ordered autopsy would be an appropriate sanction, even though it might impact the client
and even preclude the plaintiff from pursuing his claims against the defendants. The
court reasoned that the remedy served the dual purpose of mitigating any prejudice
experienced by the defendants and providing a sufficient deterrent to others who may be
tempted to purposely destroy important evidence.

4

During the September 30, 2008 hearing to discuss the fourth scheduling order,
the trial court specifically advised the parties that "[i]f the Court needs to intervene on
discovery, then motions need to be filed." (R. 67.)
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In this case, the trial court "properly balanced the nature of the sanction" with the
Welshes' failure to disclose their expert witnesses, and "imposed a sanction not only well
within its power but also carefully and narrowly crafted to address the violation."
Stevenett, 1999 UT App 80 at f24 (failure to supplement interrogatories regarding
affirmative defenses supported by an independent medical examiner (IME) warranted
narrowly crafted sanction of limiting the IME's testimony). Although the trial court
could have been well within its exercise of discretion to dismiss the entire case, instead it
dismissed only the claims that required expert testimony and allowed the Welshes to
proceed with their res ipsa claims.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY MAINTAINED THE WELSHES' DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS IN ISSUING SANCTIONS BASED UPON THE
WILLFUL NONCOMPLIANCE DEMONSTRATED IN THE RECORD.
Finally, in keeping with the tenets of due process, the Welshes were afforded an

opportunity to address the discovery violation and court-imposed sanction even absent
oral argument. Following the trial court's January 22, 2009 order imposing the sanction,
the Welshes filed a Motion for Relief from that order and fully explained the detailed
circumstances surrounding the conduct for which they were sanctioned—their failure to
file their expert designations by the deadline.
The due process right to respond does not necessarily require an adversarial
evidentiary hearing and may be limited to the record. F.D.LC. v. Daily, 973 F.2d 1525,
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1531 (10 Cir. 1992). Indeed, the court's decision to issue sanctions was properly
supported by the record. Multiple scheduling orders had been disregarded, the trial court
directed that the fourth scheduling order entered September 30, 2008 was the last
amended order and that the case would be dismissed if it was not moved forward, the
Welshes nonetheless filed a motion requesting an amendment to the fourth scheduling
order, and the Welshes failed to designate experts by the December 1, 2008 deadline.
The trial court also considered the contents of the Welshes' brief in support of
their motion for relief, which detailed the circumstances surrounding the behavior for
which the Welshes were sanctioned. Mr. and Mrs. Welsh do not claim that any
arguments were omitted from their reconsideration motion and brief. Therefore, even
though the trial court decided not to entertain oral argument, the Welshes' due process
rights were not impinged. See F.D.I.C., 973 F.2d at 1532 (failure to hold an evidentiary
hearing before entering sanction of default judgment was not abuse of discretion).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision to deny the Welshes' request for additional time to
designate their experts and to bar the Welshes from presenting expert testimony at trial as
a sanction were well within its broad discretion and are supported by the record.
Accordingly, Lakeview Hospital respectfully asks this Court to affirm the trial court's
January 22, 2009 and April 14, 2009 orders and remand the case for further proceedings
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g claim,
DATED this 19th day of November, 2009.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

Tawni J. Anderson"
Stephen D. Alderman
Shelley M. Doi
Attorneys for Hospital Corporation of Utah
d/b/a Lakeview Hospital
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Exhibit A

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Failure to Make or Cooperate in Discovery;
Sanctions.
* **
(b) Failure to comply with order.
* **
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an order entered under
Rule 16(b) . .. . unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the court in
which the action is pending may take such action in regard to the failure as are just, including
the following:
* * *

(b)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or
defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed,
dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by default against
the disobedient party;
* **

Exhibit B
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JAN 2 2 2009
SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE L. WELSH and
CAROL WELSH,

RULING ON MOTION FOR
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME AND
DEFENDANT LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH,
d/b/a LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL,

Case No. 060700106
Judge Michael G. Allphin

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs motion for enlargement of time and the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding
papers, along with their supporting documentation. Having considered all of the arguments,
determined that a hearing is unnecessary for the Court's ruling, being fully advised in the
premises, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the plaintiffs motion for
enlargement of time and DENIES the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND
On February 28, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant alleging
negligence and loss of consortium. In their complaint, the plaintiffs' alleged to have provided the
defendant with a notice of their intent to commence a medical malpractice action and to have
complied with the statutory requirements concerning pre-litigation review of their medical
malpractice claims.

On April 13, 2006, the defendant answered the plaintiffs' complaint denying liability.
Thereafter, on August 10, 2006, the Court issued a Rule 26(f) attorney planning meeting
report and scheduling order for this litigation. This order was subsequently amended on May 25,
2007, and again on February 12, 2008.
On September 30, 2008, the Court held a telephone conference regarding a third amended
scheduling order. During this telephone conference, the Court stressed that this matter had
moved too slowly and that it would not permit further extensions of time or additional
amendments beyond its third amended scheduling order. The Court then issued its third amended
scheduling order, to which the parties had stipulated. Within this order, the Court wrote: "Last
amended order, case to move along or it will be dismissed." The third amended scheduling order
set the date for the plaintiffs' initial expert reports and disclosures as December 1, 2008.
Subsequently, on November 26,2008, the plaintiffs' filed a motion for enlargement of
time and supporting affidavit of counsel.1 In his supporting affidavit, counsel for the plaintiffs
acknowledged that the Court had been "very patient in the scheduling of this case" and indicated
a commitment to moving this case forward. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' requested additional
time to submit their initial expert reports and disclosures.2
On December 5, 2008, and in response to the plaintiffs not submitting their initial expert
reports and disclosures by the December 1, 2008 deadline, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment and supporting memorandum. In its supporting memorandum, the defendant
argued that because the plaintiffs had failed to timely submit any expert testimony pertaining to

1

On November 26, 2008, the plaintiffs also filed a motion to shorten the response time for the defendant's
memorandum in opposition to their motion for enlargement of time. The Court granted this motion on December 10,
2008, and the defendant subsequently timely served its opposing memorandum on the plaintiffs.
2
The plaintiffs' motion purposed the Court change the December 1, 2008 cutoff for submitting their initial expert
reports and disclosures to January 9, 2009.
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the issue of the requisite standard of care, the plaintiffs couid not establish a prima facie claim of
medical malpractice. The defendant further asserted that it had not breached the stand of care for
a hospital and thus summary judgment was appropriate.
The defendant then, on December 15, 2008, filed a memorandum in opposition to the
plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time. In its memorandum, the defendant noted that the
Court had made it clear during the September 30, 2008 telephone conference that it would not
allow further amendments to the scheduling order. The defendant also asserted that there is no
good faith basis for the plaintiffs to request additional time to complete discovery and designate
expert witnesses, particularly in light of the Court's prior admonishment.
On December 17, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in support of their
motion for enlargement of time.3 In their reply, the plaintiffs again acknowledged the Court's
need to move the case efficiently towards a resolution. The plaintiffs' then asserted that the delay
in expert discovery was due to the defendant not cooperating with the plaintiffs' attempts to
schedule certain employees of the defendant for deposition. Concurrent with their reply
memorandum, the plaintiffs filed a request to submit for decision regarding their motion for
enlargement of time.
Additionally on December 17, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In their memorandum, the plaintiffs asserted that
their claim of negligence was not strictly a medical malpractice claim. The plaintiffs then argued
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur creates an issue of material fact, which warrants the Court's
denial of the defendant's motion even in the absence of expert testimony. The plaintiffs averred

3

The plaintiffs also on December 17, 2008, filed a designation of expert witnesses. This designation was not
accompanied with the experts' reports and wasfiledover two (2) weeks late under the third amended scheduling
order.
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that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur establishes a prima facie case of negligence from the
circumstances of a case based on the knowledge and experience of laypersons and thus expert
testimony is unnecessary for the plaintiffs' claims,4 The plaintiffs also argued that denial of the
defendant's motion is warranted under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as the
plaintiffs were unable to present facts essential to their opposition due to the defendant's lack of
cooperation in arranging depositions with key witness,5
Finally, on December 24, 2008, the defendant filed a reply memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment. In its reply, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs had not met
the requirements of res ipsa loquitur and cited several cases from jurisdictions outside of Utah
that hold res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable in medical malpractice cases.6
On January 2, 2009, the defendant filed a notice to submit for decision regarding its
motion for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
I.

The plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time,
"A trial judge is given a great deal of latitude in determining the most fair and efficient

manner to conduct court business." Morton v. Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah
1997). The plaintiffs' instant motion requested the Court enlarge the time for filing their initial
4

See Nixdorfv Hicken, 612 P 2d 348, 352-54 (Utah 1980), Virginia S v Salt Lake CaieCtr, 741 P 2d 969, 972-73
(Utah Ct App 1987), Baczuk v Salt Lake Regional Med 0 , 8 P 3d 1037, 1039-42 (Utah Ct App 2000)
5
In support of their Rule 56(f) argument, the plaintiffs filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit of counsel, which indicated the
plaintiffs had made at least two (2) requests to depose certain employees of the defendant, but were unable to take
such depositions due to the defendant's failure to produce the witnesses Notably, however, the Court has no record
of the plaintiffs attempting to subpoena these witness ot set a date for their deposition
6
See Falcher v St Luke's Hosp Med Ctr, 506 P 2d 287 (Anz Ct App 1973), Dollins v Hartford Acci & Indem
Co , 477 SW 2d 179 (Ark 1972), Tayloi v Beardstown, 491 NE 2d 803 (111 App Ct 1986), Tuggle v Hosp Auth
Of Gwinnett County, 211 SE 2d 167 (Ga Ct App 1974), Griggs v Morehead Mem 7 Hosp , 345 SE 2d 430 (N C
Ct App 1986), Miller v Delaware County Mem 7 Hosp , 239 A 2d 340 (Pa 1968)
7
Subsequently, on January 9, 2009, the plaintiffs submitted their expeit reports to the defendant This submission
was served on the defendant ovei one (1) month late under the timeline of the Couit's third amended scheduling
older
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expert reports and disclosures. The plaintiffs have made this motion despite the Court's poor
warnings that it would not permit additional extensions of time for discovery. Based on this
litigation's slow progress over the past two (2) plus years and the Court's issuing four (4)
scheduling orders, the Court expressly warned the parties that no additional extensions of time or
amendments to its scheduling order would be permitted. The Court has granted the plaintiffs
ample time to designate their expert witnesses and submit their expert reports and disclosures.
Further, the plaintiffs have provided the Court with no persuasive good faith basis or justification
for granting their motion for enlargement of time. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the plaintiffs'
motion for enlargement of time.
In addition to denying the plaintiffs' motion, the Court shall also impose sanctions
against the plaintiffs. "Trial courts have broad discretion in selecting and imposing sanctions for
discovery violations, including dismissing the noncompliant party's pleadings." Tuck v. Godfrey,
981 P.2d 407,411 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (Internal quotations omitted); see also SFR, Inc. v.
Comtrol, Inc., Ill P.3d 629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) ("the trial court has 'broad discretion' to
select among the 'full range of options' in deciding which sanction to apply to the violator.").
Here, the third amended scheduling order, which governs the timing of this litigation set a
December 1, 2008 deadline for the plaintiffs to submit their initial expert reports and disclosures.
The plaintiffs' failed to submit their initial expert reports and disclosures by this date and have
provided the Court no adequate justification for their failure to comply with the Court's
scheduling order.
Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part: "If a party or a
party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order ... the court, upon motion or its own
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initiative, may take any action authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)." Due to the Court's prior
admonishment of the parties for not timely moving this litigation forward and the Court's
express warning that it would not permit further extensions of time or amendments to its
scheduling order, the Court finds that sanctions are appropriate for the plaintiffs' failure to
comply with discovery deadlines.
Under Rule 37(b)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may "prohibit
the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses or from
introducing designated matters in evidence^]" In light of the circumstances of this case and the
plaintiffs' failure to timely submit their initial expert reports and disclosures, the Court finds this
an appropriate sanction to impose against the plaintiffs. The Court shall therefore prohibit the
plaintiffs from introducing any expert testimony at trial regarding their claims.
II.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P 56(c);
See also Baczuk, 8 P.3d at 1039. Additionally, "[sjummary judgment should be granted with
great caution in negligence cases." Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985). Due to the
plaintiffs' failure to and timely submit their expert reports and disclosures, the defendant has
moved the Court for summary judgment.
The defendant has argued that absent expert testimony, the plaintiffs cannot establish the
standard of care necessary to set forth a prima facie case of medical malpractice. However,
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contrary to the defendant's assertion and as argued by the plaintiffs, Utah courts have recognized
and applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases of medical malpractice.8
"Typically [in medical malpractice cases], the standard of care and the defendant's
breach of that standard must be established through expert testimony." Pete, 141 P.3d at 636.
However, Utah courts have long recognized an exception to this requirement. Id. Specifically,
the Utah Supreme Court in Nixdorfv. Hicken stated:
"expert testimony is unnecessary to establish a standard of care owed the
plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is within the
common knowledge and experience of the layman." 612 P.2d at 352.
The Court in Nixdorfhold that, [w]hen the appropriate evidentiary basis is presented a plaintiff
may employ the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to carry [the] burden [of establishing the requisite
standard of care]." Id.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine that arises when the plaintiff
can establish: "(1) the accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would not
have happened had the defendant used due care, (2) the instrument or thing causing the injury
was at the time under the management and control of the defendant, and (3) the accident
happened irrespective of any participation at the time by the plaintiff." Id. at 352-353.
Here, the plaintiffs have alleged and argued that: (1) Mr. Welsh's fail from the exam
table to the floor is not the type of event one would expect had he been properly supervised and
stabilized by the defendant; (2) the defendant had control of the exam table and had custody of
Mr. Welsh while he was being examined and treated; and (3) while Mr. Welsh may have been
the one to faint or lose control of his physical faculties, the defendant was aware of his

8

See Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352-54 (Utah 1980); Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care Or., 741 P.2d 969, 972-73
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Baczuk v. Salt Lake Regional Med. Or., 8 P.3d 1037, 1039-42 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); Pete v.
Youngblood, 141 P.3d 629 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
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vulnerable state, i.e. incapacitated in a similar way to one who is disabled or under anesthesia,
and should have taken proper precautions to prevent his fall.
Given nature of the accident being a fall after admission to an emergency room due to a
fainting episode and head injury, and consistent with the plaintiffs' allegations and arguments,
the Court finds that it is within the common knowledge and experience of a lay person to
determine if the defendant breached its standard of care. Accordingly, the plaintiffs may employ
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this matter to establish that the defendant acted negligently.
Thus, a material issue of fact does exist as to the plaintiffs' claims and summary judgment is not
appropriate. The Court must therefore DENY the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES the plaintiffs motion for enlargement of time. Further, in light of the
plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Court's scheduling order, and pursuant to Rules 16(d) and
37(b)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court shall prohibit the plaintiffs from
introducing any expert testimony at trial regarding their claims. The Court also DENIES the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court directs the plaintiff to prepare and submit
an order consistent with and reflecting this ruling.
Date signed:^

ISTRICT C
MICHAEL G
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
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WAYNE L. WELSH and
CAROL WELSH,

RULING ON MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM ORDER AND FOR ENTRY OF
ORDER ENLARGING TIME

Plaintiffs,.
vs.

Case No. 060700106

HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH,
d/b/a LAKEVTEW HOSPITAL,

Judge Michael G. Allphin

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs motion for relief from order and for
entry of order enlarging time. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along
with their supporting documentation. Having considered all of the arguments, determined that a
hearing is unnecessary and will not aid in the Court's ruling, being fully advised in the premises,
and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the plaintiffs motion for relief from order
and for entry of order enlarging time.
BACKGROUND
On February 28,2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant alleging
negligence and loss of consortium. The defendant filed its answer on April 13,2006, denying
liability.

Thereafter, on August 10,2006, the Court issued a Rule 26(f) attorney planning meeting
report and scheduling order. This order was subsequently amended on May 25, 2007, and again
on February 12,2008.
On September 30, 2008, the Court held a telephone conference regarding a third amended
scheduling order. During this telephone conference, the Court stressed that this matter had
progressed too slowly and that it would not permit further extensions of time or additional
amendments beyond a third amended scheduling order. The Court then issued its third amended
scheduling order, to which the parties had stipulated. Within this order, the Court wrote: "Last
amended order, case to move along or it will be dismissed/5 The tliird amended scheduling order
set the deadline for the plaintiffs' initial expert reports and disclosures as December 1, 2008.
Subsequently, on November 26,2008, the plaintiffs' filed a motion for enlargement of
time and supporting affidavit of counsel In his supporting affidavit, counsel for the plaintiffs
acknowledged that the Court had been "very patient in the scheduling of this case" and indicated
a commitment to moving this case forward. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs requested additional time
to submit their initial expert reports and disclosures.1
On December 5,2008, and in response to the plaintiffs not submitting their initial expert
reports and disclosures by the third amended scheduling order's December 1,2008 deadline, the
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.2 The defendant then, on December 15,2008,
filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time. In its
memorandum, the defendant noted that the Court had made it clear during the September 30,

1

The plaintiffs' motion purposed the Court change the December 1,2008 cutoff for submitting their initial expert
reports and disclosures to January 9, 2009.
2
By written ruling dated January 22, 2009, the Court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
indicating that the plaintiffs' claims would survive despite the Court's prohibiting the plaintiffs' use of belated
expert discovery materials at trial.
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2008 telephone conference that it would not allow further amendments to the scheduling order.
The defendant also asserted that there is no good faith basis for the plaintiffs to request additional
time to complete discovery and designate expert witnesses, particularly in light of the Court's
prior admonishments.
On December 17, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in support of their
motion for enlargement of time. In their reply, the plaintiffs again acknowledged the Court's
need to move the case efficiently towards a resolution. Concurrent with their reply
memorandum, the plaintiffs filed a request to submit for decision regarding their motion for
enlargement of time.
On December 29,2008, and unaware of the Court's prior admonishment over the slow
progress of this matter and the Court's warning within the third amended scheduling order that it
would not permit further time extensions in this matter, the Court's clerk contacted the plaintiffs'
counsel and indicated that a proposed order granting the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of
time should be submitted. That same day, the Court's clerk also entered a note on the Court's
docket stating: "Mr, Steward's Motion to Enlarge Time is granted, last time. He needs to submit
an order. I called his office this date." The plaintiffs subsequently submitted their proposed order
on January 15,2009.
Meanwhile, the Court requested its law clerk review the Court's case file and pleadings
regarding the parties' pending motions. Upon such review, the Court was apprised of its warning
within the third amended scheduling order and prior admonishments, and determined that its

3

The plaintiffs also on December 17, 2008,fileda designation of expert witnesses. This designation was not
accompanied with the experts' reports and wasfiledover two (2) weeks late under the third amended scheduling
order. Subsequently, on January 9,2009, the plaintiffs submitted their expert reports to the defendant. This
submission was served on the defendant over one (1) month late under the deadline for such expert discovery within
the Court's third amended scheduling order.
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prior admonishments and discovery order would stand. The Court then declined to execute the
plaintiffs' proposed order and issued a written ruling, dated January 22,2009 (herein, the
"Ruling"), denying the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time and prohibiting the plaintiffs
from using the belated expert discovery materials at trial
In response to the Court's Ruling, the plaintiffs filed the instant motion for relief from
order and for entry of order enlarging time. In their supporting memorandum filed concurrently
therewith, the plaintiffs argued that their reliance on the Court's clerk's request for submission of
a proposed order and the Court docket's note of December 29,2008, justify relief from the
Court's Ruling. The plaintiffs asserted that because they believed that the motion for
enlargement of time was granted, considerable time and money was expended to produce their
expert discovery. The plaintiffs further argued that the imposed sanction preventing the
plaintiffs' use of expert testimony is unwarranted and extreme, despite the Court's prior
discovery order, which stated dismissal would occur if the case did not progress.
On February 12,2009, the defendant served its memorandum in opposition to the
plaintiffs' instant motion for relief from order. In its opposing memorandum, the defendant
argued that the Court's Ruling was within the Court's authority and justified under the
circumstances of this case. The defendant asserted that the plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the
Court's clerk's statements or the docket note of December 29,2008, as the filing of the
plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time did not relieve the plaintiffs of their duty under the
Court's third amended scheduling order to serve expert designations and reports on December 1,
2008. The defendant argued that because the plaintiffs provided no compelling reason why the
deadline for expert discovery within the third amended scheduling order should be ignored, the
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Court's Ruling was appropriate. Further, the defendant posited that since the plaintiffs were well
aware of the December 1,2008 expert discovery deadline and the Court's prior admonishments
for the slow progression of this matter, the imposed sanction was appropriate. Accordingly, the
defendant submitted that the plaintiffs failed to establish a good faith basis for the Court to
amend or set aside its Ruling.
On February 23, 2009, the plaintiffs filed their reply memorandum in support of their
instant motion for relief from order. In their reply, the plaintiffs reasserted their prior arguments
regarding their reliance on the December 29,2008 statements of the Court's clerk and docket
note and that the imposed sanction is an undue prejudice to their claims. The plaintiffs further
argued that because their failure to comply with the December 1, 2008 expert discovery deadline
was not intentional or willful, the Court could not impose a sanction to exclude their use of
expert testimony at trial.
Also on February 23, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a request to submit for decision regarding
their motion for relief from order and requested oral argument on the same.4
ANALYSIS
The plaintiffs have requested relief from the Court's Ruling pursuant to Rules 54(b) and
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(b) provides in relevant part:
"[A]ny order or other form of decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties ... is subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties."

4

The Court has reviewed the parties' pleadings and supporting materials, along with the Court's file. The Court
finds that it is fully aware of the parties' arguments and the circumstances relevant to the plaintiffs' instant motion.
The Court further finds that a hearing on the plaintiffs' instant motion for relieffromorder will not aid in its ruling
on the same. The Court therefore DENIES the plaintiffs' request for oral argument Accordingly, the plaintiffs'
motion for relieffromorder and entry of order enlarging time is ripe for decision.
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Utah R. Civ. P 54(b), Further, Rule 60(b) provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding" for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7), The grant or denial of relief requested under these Rules
of Civil Procedure is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306,1312 (Utah Ct App. 1994) ("It is within the sound discretion of the trial
court to grant a motion under Rule 54(b), and the decision to do so will not be disturbed on
appeal absent an abuse of this discretion."); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318,1320 (Utah
1987) ("In reviewing a trial court's decision under Rule 60(b), we disturb the trial court only if it
has abused its discretion."). Further, "[a] trial judge is given a great deal of latitude in
determining the most fair and efficient manner to conduct court business," Morton v. Continental
Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997).5
The plaintiffs5 instant motion pertains to their motion for enlargement of time for filing
initial expert reports and disclosures. The plaintiffs made this motion despite the Court's prior
warnings that it would not permit additional extensions of time for discovery. Based on this
litigation's slow progress over the past three (3) plus years and the Court's issuing four (4)
scheduling orders, the Court found that it had granted the plaintiffs ample time to designate their
expert witnesses and submit their expert reports and disclosures by the December 1, 2008
deadline within the third amended scheduling order. Further, the Court found that the plaintiffs
provided no persuasive good faith basis or justification for granting their motion for enlargement
5

Particularly noteworthy in the instant matter, "[t]rial courts have broad discretion in selecting and imposing
sanctions for discovery violations, including dismissing the noncompliant party's pleadings." Tuck v. Godfrey, 981
P.2d 407,411 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (Internal quotations omitted); see also SFR, Inc. v, Comtrol, Inc., Ill P3d 629,
633 (Utah Ct App. 2008) ("the trial court has 'broad discretion* to select among the 'full range of options' in
deciding which sanction to apply to the violator."). "[Although some of Rule 37's discovery sanctions are harsh and
extreme, Rule 37 grants the trial court broad discretion to impose them because the trial court deals first hand with
the parties and the discovery process." Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah a . App. 1997).
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of time. Accordingly, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time. In
addition, because the plaintiffs failed to comply with the deadlines of the third amended
scheduling order, the Court imposed sanctions against the plaintiffs pursuant to Rules 16(d) and
37(b)(2)(B). Specifically, the Court's Ruling prohibited the plaintiffs from introducing any
expert testimony at trial regarding their claims.
The plaintiffs now seek relieffromthis Ruling due to their alleged reliance on the Court's
clerk requesting submission of a proposed order and the docket note of December 29,2008.
While the plaintiffs characterize both incidents as the Court issuing its "ruling" on the motion for
enlargement of time, the Court neither entered a minute entry, made an oral ruling or order on
the record, nor prepared or executed a ruling or order to that effect. Quite simply, no ruling was
issued on the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time until the Court issued its written Ruling
of January 22,2009.
A note within the Court's docket does not constitute a ruling or order of the Court. The
primary purpose of a note within the docket is to aid in the administration of the Court's case
file. Court clerks will enter notes on the docket for several reasons, which could include: when a
submitted document is received; indication of where submitted documents are sent and to whom;
attempts of Clerks to contact counsel; or whether counsel has attempted to contact the Court.
Notes on the Court's docket are not binding determinations of the Court and the plaintiffs'
reliance on of the December 29, 2008 docket note in this matter is misplaced.
Further, while the Court's clerk may have informed the plaintiffs that the Court would
grant their motion and to submit a proposed order reflecting the same, the Court was free to
reject the proposed order and issue a written ruling on the plaintiffs' motion, even if the
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December 29,2008 docket note and clerk's statements could be considered the Court's ruling.
"It is well established that a court may vacate, set aside, or modify its orders or judgments
entered by mistake or inadvertence which do not accurately reflect the result of its judgment."
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452,456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (Internal quotation omitted).
"When a trial judge signs an order prepared by counsel, mistakenly or inadvertently assuming
that it correctly reflects the court's judgment, the mistake is of a clerical or perfunctory nature,
which the court may correct on its own motion'' Id. (citing Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 299 P.2d
827 (Utah 1956); Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a)) (Emphasis added).
Additionally, the Court finds the plaintiffs' argument that they were prejudiced by the
December 29,2008 statements of the Court's clerk unpersuasive and without merit. As correctly
noted by the defendant, the plaintiffs merefilingof a motion for enlargement of time did not
relieve the plaintiffs of their duty under the third amended scheduling order to serve expert
designations and reports on December 1,2008. Any statements made by the Court's clerk were
made twenty-nine (29) days after the plaintiffs' failed to comply with the expert discovery
deadline. On December 1, 2008, rather than making somefilingin regard to their expert
designations and reports, the plaintiffs instead made the assumption that the Court would grant
its motion and acted accordingly. The Court finds this assumption unjustified, particularly in
light of the Court's prior admonishments and express warning within the third amended
scheduling order that no further extensions oftimewould be permitted.
Finally, with regard to the sanction imposed by the Court for the plaintiffs' failure to
comply with the third amended schedulmg order, the Court againfindsthe plaintiffs' arguments
unpersuasive and without merit. Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the
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Court clear authority to impose "any action authorized by rule 37(b)(2)" as a sanction for failing
to "obey a scheduling or pretrial order[.]" Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d). Rule 37(b)(2)(B) provides that
the Court may "prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or
defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence" as such a sanction. Utah R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(B). This is precisely the sanction imposed by the Court in this matter.
Further, Utah courts have, on numerous occasions, affirmed a trial court's decision to
exclude testimonyfromwitnesses designated untimely. See Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255,
261 (Utah 1999) ("The order refusing to permit the witness to testify is such an order [under
Rule 16(d)] and is a reasonable response to the failure to comply with the court's managerial
plan."); Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307,1310 (Utah 1993) ("Sanctions often are imposed when
parties fail to obey pretrial order requiring the attorney to file statements, witness lists, or lists of
evidence. In those situations, evidence has been excluded; defenses have been stricken.");
Rukavina v. Sprague, 170 P.3d 1138,1141 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) ("If a party fails to obey a
scheduling order, the trial court may prohibit him from introducing designated matters in
evidence.").6
Moreover, Rule 37 sanctions require afindingof "(1) the party's behavior was willful;
(2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court can attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the
party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending tofrustratethe judicial process." Morton

6

Utah courts have even dismissed a party's claims in their entirety for failing to comply v/ith discovery orders. See
Morton v. Continental Banking Co,, 938 P.2d 271,276 (Utah 1997) ("In any event, all of these cases clearly stand
for the proposition that trial courts are granted a great deal of deference in dismissing a case as a discovery
sanction."); Preston & Chambers, PC v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260,263 (Utah Ct App. 1997) ("Therefore, because the
trial court issued an order imposing a discovery deadline, which Koller failed to meet, the decision to sanction
Koller by dismissing his counterclaims is within the court's discretion."); see also Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler,
768 P.2d 950, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering Schettler's default
for his failure to comply with the court's discovery order."). Therefore, in light of the Court's warning that dismissal
would occur if the case did not progress, the Court finds that the imposed sanction on the plaintiffs is not unduly
prejudicial or overly extreme.
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v. Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah 1997). However, "[t]o find that aparty's
behavior has been willful, there need only be any intentional failure, as distinguished from
involuntary noncompliance." Id.; see also Tuck, 981 P.2d at 411 ("To support afindingof
willfulness, there need only be any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary
noncompliance. No wrongful intent need be shown.").
The instant matter is analogous to that ofDeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353 (Utah
1994). JiiDeBry, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court decision to exclude the Debrys'
use of expert testimony for failing to comply with the court's discovery order. Id. at 1361. In
reaching this decision the DeBiy Court noted:
"In sum, the DeBrys had ample notice of the deadline. Not only did they
miss that deadline, but they waited until after the discovery cut-off date to
designate witnesses. They assert no surprise, no unforeseen circumstances,
or any other legitimate excuse for their default. They simply seem to
assume that the trial judge had some duty to allow them to violate the
discovery orders for any or no reason. Under the circumstances, the trial
judge was certainly not beyond the bounds of his discretion."
Id. Likewise, in the instant matter, the plaintiffs were well aware of the expert discovery
deadlines within the Court's third amended scheduling order and of the Court's prior
admonishments regarding the slow progress of the case. The plaintiffs also have asserted neither
surprise, unforeseen circumstances, nor any other legitimate excuse for their default.
Accordingly, and particularly in light of the Court's prior admonishments, the Courtfindsthat at
a minimum, the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the discovery order was willful in that the
plaintiffs' failure to comply was not due to involuntary noncompliance.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the its original Ruling of January 22,2009 properly
denied the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time and that the imposed sanction was
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appropriate under the circumstances of this case. The Court further finds that the plaintiffs have
not met their burden under Rule 54(b) or Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
obtain relieffromthe Court's Ruling. The Court therefore DENIES the plaintiffs' motion for
relief from order and for entry of order enlarging time.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES the plaintiffs motion for relief from order and for entry of order
enlarging time. This ruling shall also constitute the Court's order in this matter; no separate order
is necessary.
Date signed^
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I N T H E SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WAYNE L. WELSH and
CAROL WELSH,
STIPULATED RULE 26(F) AMENDED
SCHEDULING ORDER

Plaintiff,
V.

CASE NO. 060700106
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH,
d/b/a LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL,

Judge Michael G. Allthin

Defendant.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), Nathan B. Wilcox of Clyde Snow Sessions &
Swenson, attorney for Wayne L. Welsh and Carol Welsh, and Gerald W. Huston of Hall Prangle &
Schoonveld, LLC, attorney for Defendant, discussed this case and agreed upon this Amended
Scheduling Order.
1.

INITIAL DISCLOSURE: The parties have already exchanged the initial

information required by Rule 26(a)(1).
<-*•

i . * A Rni*>?6(R Amended Scheduling Order
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2.

DISCOVERY PLAN: The parties jointly propose to the court the following

discovery plan:
a.

Discovery is necessary on all claims and defenses set forth in the parties'
pleadings.

b.

Fact discovery will be completed no later than Friday, October 31, 2008.
All written discovery shall be served so as to conform with this deadline.

c.

The parties agree that the following discovery methods may be used, with
responses due within thirty (30) days of the date of service plus additional
time for service by mail as provided by Rule 6(b);
(1)

Interrogatories, not to exceed 25;

(2)

Requests for Production of Documents;

(3)

Requests for Admissions; and

(4)

Depositions, not to exceed ten (10) per party and
one (1) day of seven (7) hours in length per
deposition,

d.

Plaintiffs' Initial Expert Disclosures and Reports under Rule 26(a)(3) shall be
served no later than Monday, December 1, 2008.

e.

Plaintiffs' Expert Witnesses shall be deposed by Friday, January 2, 2009.

f.

Defendant's Initial Expert Disclosures and Reports under Rule 26(a)(3) shall
be served no later than Friday, January 30, 2009.

(100062

g.

Defendant's Expert Witnesses shall be deposed by Friday, February 27,
2009.

h.

Rebuttal Reports under Rule 26(e)(1) shall be served no later than Friday,
March 27, 2009.

i.

Expert discovery will be completed no later than Friday, April 24, 2009.

j.

Supplementations are due as parties discover information or documents
requiring supplementation.

3.

OTHER ITEMS:
a.

The parties do not request a conference with the court prior to entry of the
scheduling order.

b.

The parties request a final pretrial conference in April 2009.

c.

The deadline for filing a motion to amend pleadings shall be Friday,
November 14, 2008.

d.

The deadline for serving dispositive or potential dispositive motions shall be
Friday, May 11, 2009.

e.

The potential for settlement cannot be determined at this time.

f.

The potential for resolution of this matter through the court's alternative
dispute resolution program cannot be determined at this time.

g.

The deadline for holding an initial mediation or other formal settlement
conference or, in the alternative, determining such an alternative dispute
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tesolution process is not likely to be of assistance is Friday, October 17,
2008.
h.

Final lists of witnesses and exhibits pursuant to Fed.R,Civ.P. 26(a)(3) shall be
served at least thirty (30) days before trial.

i.

The parties should have fourteen (14) days after service of final lists of
witnesses and exhibits to list objections under Rule 26(a)(3).

j.

This case should be certified for trial by June 2009.

k.

The estimated length of the trial is 5 days. A jury has been demanded.

DATED this J ^ j ^ d a y of August, 2008.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

Nathan B. Wilcra
/ ^
Attorneysfor Wayne L. Welsh and Carol Welsh
DATED this J ^ Z

day of August, 2008.
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

I
Stephen Alderman
Attorneys for iMkeview Hospital

ORDER
The foregoing schedule is hereby adopted and implemented as the governing schedule in
this case.
>ERED.
IT IS SO ORDERED

^ ^

DATED this

Judge MichaelvG. AUp
Third District Court J

pr4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATED RULE 26(F)
A M E N D E D SCHEDULING ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this

^ 5

day of August,

2008 to the following:

Nathan B. Wilcox
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center
201 S. Main Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneysfor the Plaintiffs
Jennifer R. Eshelman
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2006
Attorneysfor Plaintiffs

\i^xUu^t-J^(l^)
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